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[L. A. No. 22536. In Bank. Mar. 17, 19:J3.] 
GEOHGE FARBER, an Incompetent Person, etc., Appellant, 
v. DAVID M. OLKON et al., Respondents. 
[1] Parent and Child-Care of Adult Child.-A father is required 
by law to care for and maintain an incompetent adult child. 
(Civ. Code, §206.) 
[2] Physicians-Relation to Patient--Operating With or Without 
Consent of Parent.-In case of an emergency a surgeon may 
operate on a minor child without waiting for authority from 
the parents where it appears impracticable to secure it, but 
in the absence of an emergency the parent of such a child 
may lawfully consent to the operation. 
[3] !d.-Relation to Patient-Operating With or Without Con-
sent of Parent.-Where an adult child is incompetent and 
has no legally appointed guardian, the right to consent to 
an operation on such child resides in the parent who has the 
legal responsibility to maintain the child. 
[ 4] Hospitals and Asylums- Liability- Assault and Battery.-
Where state h0spital pursuant to father's request paroled 
mental patient to a licensed private mental institution which 
was authorized to furnish medical and custodial care to 
patient, and condition of such patient had gradually deteri-
orated following a lobotomy. such institution and a physician 
thereof were justified in proceeding with electroshock treat-
ments in reliance on terms of the parole and father's signed 
consent, and such treatments did not constitute an unlawful 
assault or battery on the patient's body. 
[5] Id.-Regulation.-Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5750, prohibiting de-
tainment of involuntary patient in a private mental insti-
tution except on certificate of a doctor who has no financial 
interest in such institution, does not apply where patient is 
paroled direct to such institution by Department of Insti-
tutions. 
[6] Physicians- Malpractice- Res Ipsa Loquitur.- Doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur applies in medical malpractice cases only 
where a layman is able to say as a matter of common know!-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Parent and Child, § 15; Am.Jur., Parent and 
Child, § 68. 
[6] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Physicians and Sur-
geons, § 41; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 127. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Parent and Child,§ 17; [2, 3] Physi-
cians, § 45.1; [ 4] Hospitals and Asylums, § 8; [5] Hospitals and 
Asylums, § 7; [6, 7] Physicians, §56; [8] Physicians, § 56(3). 
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edge and observation, or from the evidence can draw an 
inference, that the consequences of professional treatment 
were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due care 
had been exercised. 
[7] !d.-Malpractice-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In action for damages 
for broken femur bones resulting from alleged negligent ad-
ministration of electroshock treatments, doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is not applicable where the machine used in giving 
such treatments was in good working order and where frac-
tures, which commonly occur in this form of treatment not-
withstanding any kind of precaution or care that can be 
taken to prevent them, constitute a calculated or even an 
expected risk of the treatment; hence opinions of experts 
are required to evaluate the procedures and hazards of shock 
treatment in a particular case. 
[8] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-Although physician administer-
ing an electroshock treatment testified that he used three 
nurses because he "felt that three nurses were necessary in 
order to properly restrain the plaintiff," the mere fact that 
only two rather than three nurses may have been used would 
not necessarily show that a reasonable standard of practice 
had been violated, the whole matter of restraint being in a 
state of great flux, with from one to five nurses being used 
by various practitioners depending on whether they felt that 
an absolute minimum or maximum of restraint was the im-
portant thing. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. David Coleman, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for bodily assault and for negligent 
administration of an electroshock treatment. Judgment for 
defendants affirmed. 
Fred Girard and Joseph D. Flaum for Appellant. 
Reed & Kirtland, David Sosson, Henry E. Kappler and 
Fred 0. Reed for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, .I.-Plaintiff, a mentally ill person appearing 
by guardian ad litem, appeals from an adverse judgment 
entered upon a directed verdict in his action to recover dam-
ages from defendants for alleged bodily assault and negli-
gence in administering an electroshock treatment to plain-
tiff. We have concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's con-
tention, the trial court's determination that he was not en-
titled to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
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correct and that, although the evidence be viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff and conflicts disregarded 
(see Huffman v. Lindquist (1951), 37 Cal.2d 465, 468-469 
[234 P.2d 34]; Lashley v. Koerber (1945), 26 Cal.2d 83, 84-
85 [156 P.2d 441] ) , defendants' motion for directed verdict 
was properly granted. It follows that the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Plaintiff was 31 years of age at the time of the treatment 
of which he here complains. He became mentally ill in .Au-
gust, 1936, at the age of 19, and since then has continued 
to suffer from chronic schizophrenia with hebephrenic and 
paranoid features with progressive mental deterioration . .After 
being cared for at his father's direction in various homes 
and sanitariums he was, in 1944, committed to Camarillo 
State Hospital, hereinafter termed Camarillo, which is under 
the supervision of the Department of Mental Hygiene1 (W elf. 
& Inst. Code, § 154), hereinafter termed the Department. 
He remained at Camarillo until August 8, 1947, when he was 
paroled to, and by Camarillo transported to, J_jos .Angeles 
Neurological Institute,2 hereinafter termed the Institute, 
under the father's agreement that he would care for and 
maintain plaintiff and, upon request, cause plaintiff's re-
turn to Camarillo at the father's own expense. Three days 
later, .August 11, 1947, the father, with permission of the 
Institute, took plaintiff for an automobile ride, but failed 
to return plaintiff thereto until August 29, 1948. In the 
meantime plaintiff had been kept for various periods at the 
father's home, in a sanitarium and in a hospital. .At the 
hospital a brain operation known as a lobotomy was per-
formed by Dr. Seletz on June 27, 1948, with the father's 
consent. (This lobotomy is mentioned here only as a rele-
vant incident in plaintiff's medical history.) 
The history given by Dr. Seletz states that the patient 
"has stereotyped behavior-will not answer questions. He 
has no discipline and continues to ramble in his speech ... 
1Also known as the Department of Institutions (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
~ 151.5). 
•Los Angeles Neurological Institute is the name under which the 
defenda.nt Olkon-Wayne, Inc., a corporation, is alleged to have con-
ducted its business, and David :M:. Olkon and George J. Wayne are 
alleged to have been employes of the corporation. Dr. Wayne testi-
fied that both Dr. Olkon and he were directors of tlte corporation and 
of the Institute. Other persons named as defendants participated as 
nurses in giving the treatment alleged to have been negligently ad-
ministered. 
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his thoughts are disjointed. . . . He refuses to use water to 
wash with since he states it is too costly. He will not bathe, 
and will not use the toilet. . . . He has had some 80 shock 
therapy treatments, both in private hospitals and at Cam-
arillo State Hospital. ... '' Following the lobotomy plain-
tiff was cared for in his father's home, but his condition 
gradually deteriorated, and he became more readily upset 
and disturbed. After consulting with Dr. Seletz, who sug-
gested that following a lobotomy "sometimes they gave shock 
treatments,'' the father returned plaintiff to the Institute 
on the evening of August 29, 1948, and at that time dis-
cussed with defendant Dr. Wayne, who is one of the direc-
tors of the Institute, plaintiff's agitated and confused be-
havior and Dr. Seletz' suggestion of shock treatment, and 
"asked Dr. Wayne to see what he could do to help the boy." 
The father also signed a written consent to administration of 
the electric shock therapy. 
Dr. Wayne, a licensed physician and surgeon who has 
specialized in psychiatry since 1940, had examined plaintiff 
when the latter had been admitted to the Institute in 1947 
and was aware of his condition and the history of his treat-
ment since then, including the lobotomy. Following further 
examination of plaintiff Dr. Wayne diagnosed his condition 
as the same as before, except worse, and on August 30, 1948, 
administered a shock treatment to him. Dr. Wayne testified 
that immediately after that treatment "there seemed to be 
evidence of a favorable response, and ordinarily we have 
found it good practice to skip a day in between each treat-
ment . . . to observe the reaction to the individual treat-
ment. . . . '' Pursuant to this practice a second treatment 
was given to plaintiff on September 1, but between five and 
ten seconds after the current was applied and while plaintiff 
was in a convulsive state a snapping or "crunching" sound 
was heard by Dr. Wayne and the attending nurses. Dr. 
Wayne, suspecting fractures of the patient's bones, ordered 
X rays, and it was discovered that both femur bones had 
broken close to the heads. Plaintiff was thereupon taken to 
Temple Hospital for treatment of the fractures, and was kept 
in hospitals and at his father's home until March, 1949, 
when at the request of the Department the father returned 
him to Camarillo. Following the fractures, plaintiff's hips 
have become permanently deformed. 
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends that as he was 
an incompetent without understanding and at the time of 
Mar.1953J FARBER v. 0LKON 
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the shock treatment here involved had no court appointed 
guardian, the treatment was administered without any au-
thorized consent thereto on plaintiff's behalf and therefore 
as a matter of law constituted an assault. Plaintiff further 
contends that the case should have gone to the jury on the 
issue of negligence, both under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and because the evidence allegedly would support a 
finding that defendants negligently failed to properly and 
adequately restrain plaintiff's body when the treatment was 
given. 
Some 450 patients are paroled from Camarillo each month. 
In 1947 plaintiff's father requested that plaintiff be paroled. 
The request for parole was taken up at a meeting of the 
hospital's staff of physicians in April, 1947, and after con-
sidering the plaintiff's "hopeless mental condition" and un-
fortunate personal habits an "indefinite parole direct to li-
censed mental sanitarium'' was recommended. The father 
upon being informed that "I should find a licensed place," 
made arrangements for plaintiff to be cared for at the In-
stitute, which is a mental hospital licensed under section 
5700 et sequitur, of the ·welfare and Institutions Code and 
under division XP of the rules and regulations of the De-
partment (which were introduced into evidence). The father 
also signed the customary parole agreement or "bond" with 
the Medical Superintendent of Camarillo, which provides that 
the father ''does hereby accept custody of said patient, with 
the understanding that he will continue under the jurisdic-
tion of the Division of Extramural Care of the State Depart-
ment of Institutions. It is further agreed to care for and 
maintain him and to see that he is promptly returned to the 
Hospital without any expense to the State in the event re-
turn is found necessary or advisable, or is recommended by 
the Division of Extramural Care." Plaintiff was thereupon, 
on August 8, 1947, "paroled to Los Angeles Neurological 
Institute'' for an indefinite period and was taken to the 
Institute, as related hereinabove. 
An officer of Camarillo testified that at the time plaintiff 
was paroled it was customary for parolees "to be furnished 
medical care by either a State licensed institution or the 
person to whom they were paroled,'' and that the Depart-
"This division deals with the establishing, licensing, inspecting, man-
agement, conduct, and personnel of private institutions for the care 
of insane and incompetent persons. 
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ment ''looked to the person to whom the patient was paroled 
to furnish the custodial care and also the medical care as 
they might require ... "; that plaintiff "was paroled to the 
Los Angeles Neurological Institute and to no one else," and 
that both the Institute and the father had the responsibility 
to see that plaintiff had such medical care and maintenance 
as he might require. 'fhe witness further stated that the 
Department knew that the Institute was ''a licensed mental 
hospital at the time .... And ... a place where medical 
and psychiatric care could be furnished,'' and affirmed that 
as specified by rule 10 of division XI of the Department's 
rules and regulations ''All patients who are confined or 
reside in llicensed, private J institutions, except those whose 
religious beliefs are in opposition to the receiving of medical 
attention, must be supervised and visited by a regularly li-
censed physician, and treatment must be outlined and shown 
in the records'' ;4 that from the time plaintiff was paroled 
to the Institute in August, 1947, until the parole was termi-
nated by the Department in March, 1949, there was "in ac-
cordance with the last agreement signed [by the father J at 
the time he [plaintiff] left [Camarillo] '' no other place au-
thorized to furnish medical care to plaintiff except the In-
stitute. 
The superintendent of Camarillo "may grant a parole or 
leave of absence to a patient under general conditions pre-
scribed by the Department." (W elf. & Inst. Code, § 6726.) 
'fhe conditions prescribed by the Department are found in 
rule 21 of division III of its rules and regulations, and in-
clude provisions that the person and the place to which the 
patient shall be paroled must be specified, that the Depart-
ment may transfer the patient from time to time as may 
seem most beneficial to the patient, and that "No person 
shall have the authority to change the conditions of any 
parole without full approval of the Department." Plaintiff 
does not suggest that the superintendent did not exercise 
a proper discretion in paroling him to the Institute, nor that 
the 28 shock treatments which the record shows were ad-
ministered to plaintiff by Camarillo were unauthorized (in-
deed, plaintiff concedes that the superintendent is directed 
4Rule 10 also provides that "Records of the reception and care of 
patients in private institutions shall be kept with details as to all 
incidents, restraint, physical and mental treatment. These records 
shall be open to inspection by the Department of Institutions or any 
other authorized agent." 
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by section 6559 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to 
treat the patients), but it is contended that because plain-
tiff was an incompetent adult rather than a minor neither 
his father nor the Institute could lawfully consent to or 
administer such treatments and, hence, that the treatment 
administered by Dr. Wayne and the Institute, constituted 
an unlawful assault and battery. 
In the first place, it is apparent from the testimony of 
the Camarillo officer quoted hereinabove, as well as from 
the Department's rules and regulations, that when a patient 
is paroled it is contemplated and customary that he receive 
appropriate medical treatment in- the licensed and inspected 
institution to which he is transferred, and that under the 
terms of the parole and the father's agreement here involved 
both the Institute and the father had the responsibility of 
seeing that plaintiff received necessary treatment. [1] More-
over a father is required under the law to care for and main-
tain an incompetent adult child ( Civ. Code, § 206; see, also, 
Anderson v. Anderson (1899), 124 Cal. 48, 54-55 [56 P. 630, 
57 P. 81, 71 Am.St.Rep. 17]). [2] It also appears to 
be the general rule that "In case of an emergency a sur-
geon may operate on a [minor] child without waiting for 
authority from the parents ... where it appears imprac-
ticable to secure it,'' but that in the absence of an emer-
gency the parent of such a child may lawfully consent to 
the operation. (See 70 C.J.S., p. 968.) [3] We are of 
the view that where an adult child is incompetent and has 
no legally appointed guardian the right to consent to such 
treatment resides in the parent who has the legal responsi-
bility to maintain such child. [4] Under the circumstances 
here shown we are persuaded that the Institute and Dr. 
Wayne were justified in proceeding with the tre<ftments in 
reliance both upon the terms of plaintiff's parole and upon 
the signed consent of the father, and that plaintiff's claim 
that Rtwh trPatllJ<'nts eonstitutP(1 an nn lawful assault or 
battery upon his body is without foundation. Cases relied 
upon by plaintiff (see JJfarkart v. Zeimer (1924), 67 Cal. 
App. 363, 367 [227 P. 683] ; lnderbitzen v. Lane Hospital 
(1932), 124 Cal.App. 462, 467-468 [12 P.2d 744, 13 P.2d 
905]; Valdez v. Percy (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 491 [96 
P.2d 142]; Estrada v. Orwitz (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 54 
[170 P.2d 43]; Hively v. Higgs (1927), 120 Ore. 588 [253 
P. 363, 53 A.L.R. 1052] ; Pratt v. Davis (1906), 224 Ill. 
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300 [79 N.E. 562, 7 L.R.A.N.S. 609]) involve situations 
where treatment was given or acts performed either with-
out any authorized consent whatsoever or which went be-
yond the consent given, and are not controlling here. 
[5] Section 5750 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
which prohibits the detainment in a private mental institution 
of an involuntary patient except upon the certificate of a 
doctor who has no financial interest in the institution, ob-
viously does not apply where, as here, the patient is paroled 
direct to such institution by the Department of Institutions. 
[6] It further appears that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may not be invoked by plaintiff. That doctrine 
applies in medical malpractice cases only where a layman is 
able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observa-
tion, or from the evidence can draw an inference, that the 
consequences of professional treatment were not such as 
ordinarily would have followed if due care had been exercised 
(see Engelking v. Carlson (1939), 13 Cal.2d 216,221 [88 P.2d 
695]), and it was in such situations that plaintiff was held 
entitled to the benefit of the doctrine in Ybarra v. Spangard 
(1944), 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], 
Dierman v. P1·ovidence Hospital (1947), 31 Cal.2d 290 [188 
P.2d 12], and Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Soc. 
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 301 [223 P.2d 471], upon which plaintiff 
here relies. Thus, in the Ybarra case, plaintiff while uncon-
scious on an operating table received injuries to a healthy 
part of his body, not subject to treatment or within the area 
covered by the operation, from instrumentalities used in the 
treatment; in Dierman plaintiff was injured when an ex-
plosion occurred close to her face or in her respiratory tract 
while the surgeon was cauterizing a nose wound with a hot 
electric needle; and in Cavero the infant patient died while 
undergoing a tonsillectomy under the influence of a gas 
anesthetic, and the evidence of the medical experts prima 
facie established that ''except for infected tonsils and adenoids 
and a slight temperature due to such infection, the child was 
normal and healthy,'' that the death was not due to any pre-
existing condition, and that death under such circumstances 
ordinarily does not occur when the operation is performed 
with due care and skill, i.e., in the absence of negligence; 
and, hence, it was held, in the absence of explanation by the 
defendant an inference of negligence could be drawn by the 
trier of facts. 
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[7] By contrast the undisputed testimony of both de-
fendant Dr. \Vayne and the witness Dr. Thompson in the 
instant case established that electroshock treatment is de-
signed to have ''an effect upon the entire body. The entire 
body is actually thrown into a convulsive state, and the aim 
and hope, of course, is that this convulsion, and all of the 
biochemical changes that occur with this type of convulsion, 
will produce a helpful and beneficial effect upon the patient's 
mental condition"; that "the most frequent, the most usual 
and the most common hazard which is germane, which is 
inherent in the method of treatment, is fractures. There 
are certain other hazards, and, indeed, there are some cases 
in which death has actually resulted, directly from the hazard 
germane to the treatment, but these are the calculated risks 
of the treatment .... [11']ractures occur as the result of 
muscle tension, whether it is in shock treatment or from 
stepping off of a curb . . . and in shock treatment there is 
muscle tension, which is a part of the treatment, and there-
fore . . . fracture becomes a calculated and even an expected 
risk of the treatment. . . . [T] here is a certain percentage 
of fractures which occurs notwithstanding any kind of pre-
caution or care that can be taken to prevent it .... The 
area of fracture is completely unpredictable .... [T]he over-
all incidence of fractures in shock treatment varies anywhere 
from perhaps one-half to about three and a half per cent. 
If one considers fractures of the spine . . . the incidence is'' 
between 10 and 40 per cent. Dr. Wayne's ''surmise . . . In 
retrospect" was that plaintiff's legs broke because "nutri-
tional disturbances consequent upon long-standing mental 
illness affected bony structures''; the machine used in giving 
the treatment was a standard type, "one of the best; certainly 
one of the most expensive'' and in good working order and 
''perfect condition'' ; when the ''machine is out of order it 
becomes almost immediately apparent." Under such circum-
stances the trial court correctly concluded that the opinions 
of experts are required to evaluate the procedures and hazards 
of shock therapy in any particular case and that here neither 
does the expert testimony directly show (by the opinion of 
a competent witness to that effect) that there was any lack 
of due care or skill in the conduct of defendants, nor does 
the evidence show any combination of facts and expert opinion 
from which a layman can draw the inference that the con-
sequences of the treatment administered to plaintiff were 
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not such as ordinarily, i.e., normally, may follow if due care 
has been exercised. Accordingly, no basis for invoking the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was established. The same con-
clusion upon similar facts was reached by the court in 
Qtlinley v. Cocke ( 1946), 183 'l'enn. 428 [192 S.W.2d 992]. 
[8] Plaintiff's final contention-that defendants' own evi-
dence would support a finding of negligence-is ingenious but 
utterly lacking in merit. The evidence relied upon is as fol-
lows: Dr. 'Wayne and three nurses testified at the trial that 
all three of such nurses assisted in restraining plaintiff during 
the treatment; there was no testimony that less than three 
nurses, or that any number of nurses other than three, par-
ticipated in the treatment; there was, however, a conflict 
between the testimony referred to above as adduced at the 
trial and the testimony of Dr. ·wayne and two of the nurses 
as originally given upon the taking of their depositions 
(subsequently corrected) as to the identity of one of the three 
participating nurses. Plaintiff argues that this original (later 
corrected and eliminated) conflict indicates that actually only 
two nurses assisted and that since Dr. Wayne thought it 
best to use three nurses it was negligent to use less than 
three. In drawing these factual inferences plaintiff strains 
too heavy a haul upon too thin a trace; it cannot support 
even an appellate court's appraisal of what could be sub-
stantial in a trial court. 
Even if it were assumed that only two nurses rather than 
three were used in plaintiff's case, it would not appear that 
a reasonable standard of practice had been violated. The 
only evidence as to the standard of practice was supplied by 
defendants. It is that "the whole matter of restraint ... is 
in a state of great flux,'' with from one to five nurses being 
used by various practitioners, and that ''There are some who 
restrain legs and some who do not restrain the legs at ~ll . 
. . . For example, some therapists felt that an absolute mini-
mum of restraint was the important thing; others have felt 
that an absolute maximum of restraint was the important 
thing, and there were all gradations in between.'' Dr. 
IN ayne followed a middle course as he felt that ''a mild to 
moderate amount of manual restraint should be used." "Un-
der the practice . . . in the case where the one nurse was 
used to assist the doctor . . . the upper portion . . . of the 
anatomy would be restrained ... , the lower extremities were 
allowed to move without any restraint.'' 
Mar.1953] FARBER v. OLKON 
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Plaintiff stresses that Dr. Wayne testified that in plaintiff's 
ease he used three nurses because he "felt that three nurses 
IYere necessary in order to properly restrain the plaintiff.'' 
In response to the question by plaintiff's counsel, "YVhat 
dangers did you apprehend that these nurses might be able 
to relieve against or guard against in the way of restraint?'' 
Dr. Wayne replied, "The specific danger would be too gross 
movement of the legs." Dr. ·wayne further stated that "in 
accordance with the standard of practice in 1948, that danger 
was common knowledge to all practitioners," with the q nalifi-
cation that one group of practitioners believed "that there 
is danger of bone breakage and injury if restraint is used on 
too gross movements," that another group believed "that if 
restraint is not used there is danger of bone breakage and 
muscular injury,'' and that a third gToup of practitioners, 
with whom Dr. 'vVayne agreed, stood in between; that within 
the standards ''individual patients require different amounts 
of restraint" and "under the standard" preferred by Dr. 
·wayne he "felt that George Farber required three nurses," 
disposed one at the extremities and two at the shoulders of 
the patient, but he did not believe "that with less than three 
nurses there was [more] danger of bone breakage . . . and 
the reason for it is that I use two and three nurses just as 
frequently. In this particular case in question, I used three 
... I think it would have been possible to use two nurses, 
as I check matters before and since. In other words, a question 
of two or three here is not a crucial question . . . '' 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that all of the testimony 
on the subject is to the effect that two nurses were stationed 
at plaintiff's shoulders (one at each shoulder), and that a third 
nurse stood at plaintiff's feet holding his ankles. The testimony 
relied upon by plaintiff as constituting a conflict concerned 
the identity of one of the nurses standing at plaintiff's 
shoulders, and there is no suggestion in the record or evidence 
upon which an inference could be drawn by laymen that 
plaintiff's ankles were not under restraint during the treat-
ment, or that the use of only one nurse instead of two at 
plaintiff's shoulders would have constituted a negligent con-
tribution to the fracturing of his femurs. 
Pathetic and heartrendingly grievous as is the plight of 
plaintiff-and his loyal father-there appears no basis where-
by at law and in justice the defendants sued herein can 
be held to have violated a duty or to be accountable to 
40 C.2d-17 
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plaintiff i11 <lamages. '!'he faet that what was done with dlH' 
·~are to help resulted inRtead in fnrthPr hurt srt<; 11p no ean><f' 
of action in tort. 
'!'he jn<lgnlf'nt is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, ,J., 'l'raynor, ,T., and 
Spence, J ., concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
l cannot agree with the majority that the doetrine o[ ret:: 
ipsa loquitur may not be invoked by the plaintiff in this 
appalling case. If ever a situation existed where it was more 
applicable it has not been called to my attention. We have here 
a patient, mentally deficient, undergoing shock treatments to 
relieve that mental condition, emerging with both femur bones 
broken and a resulting permanent physical deformity. 
In Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d 687, 
162 A.L.R. 1258], this court said: "The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur has three conditions: '(1) the accident must be 
of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency 
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the de-
fendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary 
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.' (Prosser, 
'forts, p. 295.) It is applied in a wide variety of situations, 
including cases of medical or dental treatment and hospital 
care. (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82 [64 f.2d 409] ; Brown v. 
Shor-tl·idge, 98 Cal.App. 352 [277 P. 134]; Moor-e v. Steen, 
102 Cal.App. 723 [283 P. 833]; Armstr-ong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. 
App.2d 429 [ 47 P.2d 740]; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173 
Cal. 156 [159 P. 436]; Ver-geldt v. Hartzell, 1 F.2d 633; 
lllaki v. 1llurray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251 [7 P.2d 228]; Whet-
stine v. Mor-avec, 228 Iowa 352 [291 N.W. 425] ; see Shain, 
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 187, 196.) 
'"!'here is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent 
to which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in cases of in-
jury from medical treatment. This is in part due to the 
tendency, in some decisions, to lay undue emphasis on the 
limitations of the doctrine, and to give too little attention 
to its basic underlying purpose. 'l'he result has been that 
a simple, understandable rule of circumstantial evidence, 
with a sottnd background of common sense a.nd human exper-i-
ence, has occasionally been transformed into a rigid legal 
formula, which arbitrarily precludes its application in rnany 
Mar. 195:3] FARBER v. 0LKON 
(40 C.2d 503; 254 P.2d 520] 
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cases where it is most important that it should be applied. 
If the doctrine is to contimw to serve a useful purpose, we 
should not forget that 'the particular force and justice of 
the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing ttpon the party 
charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the cir-
cumstance that the ch·ief evidence of the true cause, whether 
culpable or innocent, is p·ractically access·ible to him but in-
accessible to the injttred person.' (9 Wigmore, Evidence 
[3d ed.J, § 2509, p. 382 .... " (Emphasis added.) 
In the Ybarra case, the plaintiff was to have an appendec-
tomy. He emerged from the anesthetic with an injured 
i-ihoulder from which he developed a paralysis and atrophy 
of the muscles surrounding it. This case the majority seeks 
to distinguish on the ground that he received injury to a 
healthy part of his body not within the area to be covered 
by the operation. Does not that same fact prevail here? 
Plaintiff was to be treated for a mental condition and 
emerged with fractured femurs. 
To say that the doctrine was applicable and an instruc-
tion thereon should have been given, is not to say that every 
time the doctrine is invoked, the person relying thereon is 
entitled to recover damages. All that the law requires is, 
that the defendant charged with negligence rebut the in-
ference of negligence by giving a reasonable explanation of 
the cause of the injury. This is as it should be in a situa-
tion where the instrumentality causing the injury is within 
the exclusive control of the defendant, or his agents, aud 
particularly so where, as here, a plaintiff was unconsciom 
and, even had he not been mentally incompetent, completely 
unable to testify as to what occurred. As was said in the 
Ybarra case "the particular force and justice of the rule 
... consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of 
the true eause, whether cttlpable or innocent, is practically 
accessible to him r the defendant l but inaccessible to thf' 
injured person." (Emphasis added.) 
With respect to the confusion as to whether there had 
been two or three nurses holding plaintiff on the table dur-
ing the shock treatment, I cannot refrain from noting with 
amusement, a quotation from the testimony of defendant, 
Dr. Wayne. He is reported as saying, in part, "I think it 
would have been possible to use two nnrses, as I check mat-
ters before and since. In other words, a question of two or 
three here is not a crucial question . .. .'' (Emphasis added.) 
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Since when has it been necessary for a defendant to point 
out to a court and jury what is a crucial question in a case~ 
I am also amused at the statement in the majority opinion 
that ''Pathetic and heartrendingly grievous as is the plight 
of plaintiff-and his loyal father-there appears no basis 
whereby at law and in justice the defendants sued herein 
can be held to have violated a duty or to be accountable to 
plaintiff in damages.'' As I have heretofore pointed out, in-
vocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a case such 
as this is not only proper, but the fair, just and equitable 
thing to do. And, had the doctrine been invoked, and an 
instruction given thereon, the heartbroken majority of this 
court would merely have been declaring the law, not trans-
gressing it. 
I would reverse the judgment in the hope that justice might 
be done on a retrial of the cause. 
[S. F. Nos. 18118, 18359. In Bank. JVIar. 17, 1953.] 
SARA JANE TALBOT DIMON, Respondent, v. CHARLES 
GRAYSON DIMON, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Existence of Marital Status 
as Prerequisite.-In this state a wife's right to recover ali-
mony or support is limited to the period when the parties 
are husband and wife. 
[2] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Jurisdiction.- Language of Civ. 
Code, §§ 136, 137, 139, shows a consistent legislative purpose 
to confine powers of court to decree support to the period 
when actions for divorce, annulment and separate maintenance 
are pending, including time on appeal and such further time 
as may be within scope of decree in the particular action. 
[3] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Application.-An application for 
alimony is a collateral proceeding or episode within the di-
vorce action, authorized for a particular purpose, but de-
pendent for its maintenance on existence of the action. 
[4:] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Jurisdiction.-Court has no juris-
diction to make an award for alimony to a wife who previ-
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Divorce, § 198; [2] Divorce, § 178; 
[3] Divorce, §181; [4] Divorce, §200; [6,11] Parent and Child, 
§ 28; [7] Parent and Child, § 36; [8] Parent and Child, § 30; 
[9] Divorce, § 295; [10] Divorce, §§ 295, 296; [12] Parent and 
Child, § 26; [13] Husband and Wife, § 178. 
